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C. S. Peirce on Interpretation and Collateral Experience  
 
Abstract 
This article examines C. S. Peirce's conception of collateral experience and its 
relation to his account of interpretation. The essay proceeds through a general 
presentation of the two principal phases of Peirce's theory of signs. The key 
issue of the character of experience is discussed in relation to the problem of 
the ubiquity of interpretation. The main upshot of the analysis is that the 
concept of 'collateral experience' is a crucial component in Peirce's mature 
semeiotic; on the one hand, the collaterality of experience indicates a limit of 
the semiotic domain, but on the other hand, collateral experience enters into 
symbolic semiosis as something that needs to be indicated for 
contextualisation to take place. The article concludes with some reflections on 
Peirce's ambiguous use of the concept of 'experience'. 
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Introduction 
Over the years, the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce has come to mean widely 
different things to different people. In fact, it would be difficult to find another 
relatively recent philosopher who has attracted such a motley collection of 
friends and foes as Peirce. Pragmatists of various stripes have seen him as a 
worthy pioneer or a questionable expounder of outmoded ideas. Parts of his 
philosophy have been acceptable to logical positivists, others to 
poststructuralists; but his philosophical corpus has also been dismissed as too 
fragmentary and internally incoherent to serve as anything but a collection of 
disconnected insights.  
At the same time, recent work by more specialised investigators of Peirce’s 
thought has revealed that his philosophy may be more cohesive than has been 
claimed (see, e.g., Savan 1983; Hausman 1993; Parker 1998). Ever since Peirce’s 
writings were rescued from philosophical oblivion about 70 years ago, a debate 
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concerning the character and consistency of his corpus has flourished.
1 
The 
fluctuations between extreme poles of interpretation in earlier readings of Peirce 
can at least partly be explained by the fact that his philosophy was rarely taken 
on its own terms. In particular, his peculiar semiotic approach was for a long time 
ignored or reduced to a relatively insignificant role in the explications of his 
philosophy, rather than being seen as a possible integrating framework for the 
understanding of his thought. While there is still no consensus regarding the 
precise character and contemporary relevance of Peirce’s ‘semiotic turn’, the 
tendency is clear: Peirce’s sign-theoretical writings are nowadays often assigned 
a central place in the expositions.  
Although my general framework is Peirce’s semeiotic,
2 
and I believe that 
the semiotic approach is the most promising way to get to grips with his thought, 
I will nevertheless identify certain tensions in Peirce’s sign-theoretical output in 
this paper. I intend to examine Peirce’s claim that collateral experience of objects 
is a prerequisite for our grasp of significant relations, and how this affects his 
view of the omnipresence of interpretation in cognition. This is by no means a 
completely ignored issue in Peirce studies, but one which nonetheless would 
merit more careful attention. Namely, the question of the role of collateral 
factors in our grasp of sign relations is one which bears on several crucial issues 
in Peirce studies, such as the character of Peirce’s realism and its relation to his 
idealistic tendencies, and on the central semiotic and pragmatic issue of the 
possible limits of interpretation. Moreover, the problem of collateral experience 
is one that ought to be of some interest outside of Peirce scholarship, as it can be 
related to such issues as the context-dependence of speech acts and the 
relevance of a shared background for communication. I will not pursue possible 
connections between Peirce’s ideas and those of other philosophers in this 
paper, though.  
The primary question that I will try to answer is What is Peirce’s notion of 
collateral experience, and how does it relate to his account of interpretation? 
However, before we turn to this issue, it is necessary to make a couple of 
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preparatory surveys. I will first give a rough sketch of Peirce’s semiotic approach, 
and its two main phases, and then note some problems associated with his 
general account of interpretation. The main topic, the collateral factors involved 
in the interpretation of signs, will be addressed in the third section. I will 
conclude the paper with a couple of reflections on Peirce’s ambiguous use of the 
concept ‘experience’, and will offer some indications of how the identified 
tensions may be reduced.  
 
From a Semiotic Point of View  
Peirce considers the question of collateral experience primarily in discussions of 
a certain kind of sign use, namely the functioning of signs in communicational 
interaction. The issue is especially likely to come up when the office of certain 
signs as identifiers of the subject-matter of speech acts is being explored. From 
this one might easily be led to conclude that the proper frame of reference for 
the topic is the philosophy of language, in one of its contemporary senses. This 
conclusion is perhaps not completely erroneous; but it is still somewhat 
misleading. A strictly linguistic understanding of Peirce’s ‘sign’ and related 
concepts will quickly be seen to be untenable, or else his position will almost 
certainly appear unintelligible. According to Peirce, the sphere of signs is not 
exhausted by linguistic signs; nor does Peirce think (as many later semioticians 
have thought) that all signs should be analysed using the concepts and methods 
of linguistics. While Peirce paid more attention to natural languages and other 
sign-systems than most of his predecessors, he did not make a full-scale 





If we ought not read Peirce as a philosopher of language, then it is 
reasonable to ask in what kind of a frame of understanding Peirce’s discussions 
of signs actually operate? As has already been indicated, Peirce embraces 
something that could be dubbed a ‘semiotic point of view’ – that is, a 
philosophical perspective that stresses the relevance of signs and sign-actions in 
science, cognition, perception, and in almost any domain imaginable. Although it 
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is not possible to explicate this approach in any detail here, some general 
remarks are in order, as they set the scene for the more specific problems to be 
discussed later.  
First of all, we may note that Peirce’s preoccupation with semiotic issues is 
something that covers most of his philosophical career. Joseph Ransdell (1977, p. 
158) has claimed that as much as 90 % of Peirce’s production is directly 
concerned with semiotic matters. This seems to be an exaggeration, unless we 
understand ‘semiotic’ in a very wide sense that would render almost any 
philosophy, no matter of what stripe, semiotic. Furthermore, Peirce’s writings on 
explicitly sign-theoretical issues do not form a continuous and uninterrupted 
whole; in fact, there are at least two quite clearly separate semiotic periods in his 
philosophy, an early phase (c. 1862-1873) and a later one (beginning around the 
year 1885 and lasting till Peirce’s death in 1914) (cf. Bergman, forthcoming). It is 
also worth noting that Peirce’s semiotic outlook reaches something akin to 
maturity quite late; it is only by taking his late semeiotic as starting-point that a 
plausible semiotic reading of his philosophy can be achieved.  
Nonetheless, there is much that is of interest in Peirce’s early sign-
theoretical writings for the understanding of his outlook, and its subsequent 
problems and developments. In one of his earliest attempts to lay down some 
general semiotic principles, the unfinished and patchy essay “Logic of the 
Sciences” (1865), Peirce considers the question of the content or reference of 
representations. The argument runs as follows:  
 
Whatever is immediately present to us, will be instances of what is. These 
instances, have then two characters  
1 They are representations, and  
2 They are addressed to us  
That they are addressed to us, is only the limitation of our selection, and 
therefore must be abstracted from. That they are representations, arises 
from their being taken as instances. They are not merely representations of 
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instances, but are representations as instances. Hence, we presume that 
whatever is is a representation. This is confirmed by an indirect form of 
argument. If there were something which were not a representation it 
would not be represented, for an object represented is a representation of 
the same object in itself. But the supposition of anything unrepresented, is 
self-contradictory since that which is supposed is thereby represented. 




In its admittedly fragmentary form (and taken out of its broadly Kantian context), 
this argument may seem weak and implausible. However, the passage 
constitutes an important first statement of Peirce’s early, radical semiotic point 
of view. Namely, it seems to involve the claim that we cannot have any contact 
with the objects (or references) of representation, except through the mediation 
of representations. Furthermore, Peirce states that an analysis of such objects 
will show that they are themselves of a representative character. Therefore he 
draws the bold conclusion that representations form the true fabric of reality. If 
we add the fact that ‘representation’ is a synonym for what Peirce later 
designates ‘sign’ to this picture, then we can see how the passage quoted 
indicates a strong and controversial philosophical programme.  
Arguments pointing in the same direction can be found in the more 
carefully argued, but only slightly less far-reaching, anti-Cartesian (and partly 
anti-Kantian) position Peirce presents a couple of years later in a series of articles 
in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. In his discussion of the cognitive 
capacities of human beings, Peirce makes four famous denials:  
 
1. We have no power of Introspection, but all knowledge of the internal 
world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external 
facts.  
2. We have no power of Intuition, but every cognition is determined 
logically by previous cognitions.  
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3. We have no power of thinking without signs.  
4. We have no conception of the absolutely incognizable. (EP 1:30. [1868].)  
 
These assertions, taken together, form the core of Peirce’s theory of cognition. It 
is a quite subtle and complex position, but for our purposes it is sufficient to note 
its semiotic implications. Namely, the content of the four denials can be further 
condensed into the pregnant claim that all cognition and knowledge is by means 
of signs.
5 
By denying that human beings have special capacities of introspection 
and intuition, as well as holding that the ‘thing-in-itself’ (the incognisable) is a 
meaningless term, Peirce in effect paves the way for a view of mind as an 
inferential chain of signs. Consequently, what Peirce is saying is that human 
beings, as cognising creatures, are born into a world full of semiotic (or cognitive) 
processes; attempts to find a firm, non-representational foundation in the form 
of some kind of first cognition, immediately available self, or primary object will 
not be successful. They can, obviously, be considered in thought experiments, 
but closer inspection will reveal that they are, as such, empty of content.  
The view sketched here adds up to a kind of semiotic idealism; the only 
meaningful things, with which human beings can be in contact, are thought-
signs, which produce or determine other thought-signs, without end in sight. The 
view of semiosis
6 
presented, then, is that of an endless flow of thoughts; the 
static ‘ideas’ of traditional idealism have been replaced by dynamic signs. 
Peirce’s position retains the distinctive idealistic focus on thought, but does not 
ground meaning in plain ideational content. However, Peirce is even further 
distanced from traditional empiricism and its attempts to find a basis for 
knowledge in elementary experiences. Not surprisingly, Peirce declares that 
there is no such thing as an absolute empirical datum; an experience, no matter 
how simple, is always a sign rendered comprehensible by its position in a 
cognitive flow. There is no pure experience of something as black, because 
blackness is something that is associated with a thing in understanding; and such 
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an attribution is a complex semiotic act, performed mostly without control, but 
always against the setting of a wider semiotic background.  
According to this outline of the early semiotic stance, Peirce seems to be a 
thorough anti-foundationalist. However, it should be noted that he does not 
think that sign processes are blind or without direction; rather, he emphasises 
that it is through signs that we learn that there is such a thing as reality. This is 
discovered by error, i.e. when our signs fail us, when we are mistaken or 
surprised (see EP 1:52 [1868]). Still, this does not lead to the conclusion that 
knowledge can be secured by a simple, unmediated contact with the objects of 
reality. Instead, Peirce opts for a social and future-oriented view of reality: the 
‘real’ is the ideal end-result of information and reasoning, and it can only be 
approached in a communal setting, such as the community of inquirers. The 
claim is stronger than the mere statement that reality somehow determines our 
thought; the upshot of Peirce’s analysis is that the conception of reality 
“essentially involves the notion of COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and 
capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge” (ibid.). In other words, any 
reference to ‘reality’ here and now involves a virtual reference to the findings of 
future inquirers. In this sense, ‘reality’ is an ideal and normative concept.  
Peirce’s quasi-idealistic stance leaves many questions unanswered – at 
least in the simplified and streamlined form it has been presented here. Peirce 
seems to have felt somewhat uneasy about some of the logical consequences of 
his position, although he never explicitly abandons the early semiotic standpoint. 
Instead he moves in quite different directions in the years that follow, occupying 
himself with the logic of relations and questions related to the philosophy of 
science and pragmatism, writing little, if anything, on the theory of signs. 
However, it should be noted that the earlier semeiotic serves as a kind of 
background of Peirce’s pragmatistic writings of the 1870s; some of the most 
controversial aspects of pragmatism, such as its emphasis on long-run opinion 
and the so-called consensus theory of truth and reality, can be directly traced 
back to Peirce’s early semiotic position.  
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When Peirce turns anew to explicitly semiotic questions around the year 
1885, much has changed. Equipped with a new logical outlook, and a stronger 
belief in realism, Peirce begins to emphasise the relevance of other kinds of signs 
besides thought-signs, and attempts to break the hermetic tendency of his 
earlier theory of signs by calling attention to the role of non-semiotic experience 
as a forceful factor in semiosis. Also, Peirce begins to move away from the rather 
abstract Kantian setting of his first semiotic period, and eventually claims that 
philosophical analysis should set out from familiar communicational situations, 
i.e., sign use in a common dialogical setting, such as a conversation (see CP 8.112 
[c. 1900]) – a move that goes hand in hand with his fresh understanding of the 
intimate connections between semeiotic, pragmatism, and common-sense 
philosophy. This is not to say that Peirce’s semeiotic turns into some kind of 
ordinary language philosophy; he in fact underlines that one of his aims is to 
move beyond the ordinary understanding of what signs are (see EP 2:388 f. 
[1906]; EP 2:402 f. [1907]). That is, Peirce does not just want to give an account 
of how the word ‘sign’ is de facto used, although he now takes it to be an 
acceptable starting-point for analysis. Peirce still wants to draw attention to the 
semiotic character of phenomena that are not usually viewed as signs; but he is 
now more sensitive to the varieties and complexities of significant relations. One 
respect in which Peirce’s later approach actually calls for an expansion of the 
sphere of semeiotic is that the generalised concept of sign (sometimes called 
representamen to mark the distinction) is no longer exclusively associated with 




The Ubiquity of Interpretation  
One thing that is carried over from the early semeiotic of the Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy series to the later approach is the opinion that signs are 
not static entities. Although Peirce is fond of schematic analyses of the general 
sign relation and of quite intricate accounts of sign classification, he continues to 
affirm the active character of signs. The action of signs is characterised as an 
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interpretational or translational process, in which the sign stands for an object to 
an interpretant.  
Setting the object-pole of the relation aside for the moment, we may note 
that the interpretant seems to be a genuinely Peircean concept, although it has 
been suggested that certain late scholastic philosophers anticipated this 
discovery (see, e.g., Deely 1986). The interpretant should not be confused with 
an interpreter; Peirce is adamant on this point, although he sometimes says that 
the sign produces an effect on a person or a mind to make the notion easier to 
grasp (see, e.g., SS 81 [1908]). To simplify matters, we might characterise the 
interpretant as an interpretational or semiotic effect brought on by the sign. 
Whether Peirce’s interpretant is necessarily an effect on a human person or not 
is a problem much discussed in Peirce studies and philosophical semiotics, but 
here it may suffice to remark that whatever else Peirce’s interpretant may be, it 
at least covers the characteristic effects that signs may have on human beings. 
The important question concerns the limits of the semiotic process.  
As noted, in his early writings Peirce emphasises the open-ended character 
of the action of signs. It is not possible to set concrete limits to the process by 
finding first objects or final interpretations, except in as ideal points of 
termination, which are never reached in real life. To some extent, the later Peirce 
agrees with this point of view; he emphasises that it is characteristic of 
developed signs that they grow (EP 2:10 [c. 1894]), and offers general definitions 
of the sign as [a]nything which determines something else (its interpretant) to 
refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the 
interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum (2.303 [1902]; cf. CP 
2.92 [1902]).  
Obviously, this definition offers only a bare skeleton of the sign relation, 
and thus leaves much to be desired in terms of explication; but we need only 
note the characterisation of the sign activity involved. Namely, Peirce suggests 
that it is a genuinely continuous process, in which the interpretant of one sign in 
its turn becomes a sign, which will have an interpretant of its own, which will 
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then act as a sign, and so on. Peirce even explicitly states that if “the series of 
successive interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby rendered 
imperfect, at least” (CP 2.303 [1902]; cf. CP 2.92 [1903]).  
Now it would seem to follow from these rather sparse statements that 
Peirce holds that the interpretant must always be a sign, and that the flow of 
signs and interpretants will never terminate. This idea is nowadays known as 
unlimited semiosis, an expression coined by Umberto Eco (1977, p. 71). Now this 
process is, quite naturally, closely connected to interpretation; as Peirce states, 
“a sign only functions as a sign when it is interpreted” (MS 7:2 [c. 1903?]). This 
does not mean that a sign ceases to be a sign, if it is not constantly interpreted; 
the interpretant may be potential, as in the case of words in a book that no one 
reads or ancient inscriptions that have not been interpreted for centuries (cf. W 
1:326 [1865]). In other words, it is crucial for the being of the sign that it should 
be capable of determining an interpretant. The interpretant does not need to 
exist; a “being in futuro will suffice” (EP 2.92 [1902]).  
All this seems to point in the direction of an almost autonomous semiotic 
domain of limitless interpretation, without firm grounds which could give us the 
true meaning of the sign. At any given instant, the meaning of the sign is always 
conferred to the future. (It is perhaps now easier to see why poststructuralists 
such as Jacques Derrida find certain Peircean ideas attractive.) However, as 
several commentators have stressed (see, e.g., Gentry 1952; Short 1996), Peirce 
modifies his position as he develops his view of the interpretant. This 
modification advances in two stages, both of which may undermine the thesis of 
unlimited semiosis. First, Peirce acknowledges that signs may have effects – i.e., 
interpretants – that do not possess the character of a sign or cognition. A piece 
of music may produce an emotion and a command a specific action; and such 
effects may constitute the actual end of the semiotic process (see CP 5.475 
[1907]). Yet, these may be instances of highly successful semiotic interactions. It 
would appear, then, that there are signs that can fulfil a semiotic function quite 
well, without thereby involving an endless process of interpretation. Of course, it 
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can be argued that this applies to less developed signs, but that more evolved 
signs involve a potentially infinite series of interpretations. However, Peirce’s 
second major modification of his theory of interpretants puts further restrictions 
on the free play of interpretation. Connecting his semeiotic to his pragmatism, 
Peirce states that the meaningful development of a sign relation cannot consist 
of mere interpretation for interpretation’s sake; the sign must also have a 
potential or actual effect on our habits of action (see, e.g., EP 2:388 [1906]; CP 
5.476 [1907]). That is, an interpretation of a sign that would not, under any 
circumstances, affect the way we would act is not properly meaningful; and it is 
possible to say that the interpretation of a sign comes to a halt when it achieves 
a true alteration of our conduct.  
It seems, then, that there are significant ruptures in the semiotic process; 
in fact, Peirce’s pragmatistic analysis suggests that such stops are what 
interpretation ultimately aims for. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
habit-changes are temporary breaches in the flow of interpretation, and do not 
signal an absolute end to semiotic development through interpretation; the signs 
connected to the habits can grow by connection to other signs, which in turn will 
affect the habits involved. The ultimate habit of action may be as much an 
unreachable ideal as the final interpretation.  
Since it is difficult to find a steadfast limit to semiosis in the interpretant, it 
seems natural to turn to the object of the sign for a firm ground on which to 
build a proper semantics. Peirce often characterises the object as something that 
determines the sign; this would indicate that the true basis of semiosis is to be 
found in the referential end of the sign. That is, it seems natural to think that 
Peirce’s ‘object’ denotes the objective content of semiosis, something that is not 
touched by interpretation.  
However, as we already saw in our brief discussion of the early account of 
signs in the context of Peirce’s criticism of Cartesian philosophy, Peirce did not 
accept any conception of a substantial thing-as-such, which could serve any 
meaningful function in the account of cognition. The absolute object is an ideal 
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limit, which we may come to know better and better, but never in some kind of 
perfectly immediate relation. Moreover, Peirce states that the knowledge of the 
object will always include an interpretative element. If we could have knowledge 
of the final object, it would still be accompanied by interpretation; only, one may 
surmise, in such a case the object and the interpretation would be so intimately 
interconnected, and further fused with a habit of action, that no relevant 
distinction between the two could be made.  
The view that the object-pole of the sign relation is not free from 
representation and interpretation is expressed in an undated fragment, which 
could belong to the later as well as to the earlier theory of signs.  
 
The object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which 
the first representation is the interpretant. But an endless series of 
representations, each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to 
have an absolute object at its limit. The meaning of a representation can be 
nothing but a representation. In fact, it is nothing but the representation 
itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never 
can be completely stripped off; it is only changed for something more 
diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here. (CP 1.339.)  
 
This may be seen as a re-statement of Peirce’s early denial that we have some 
kind of direct cognitive access to objects, apart from the mediation of signs. 
However, the quote is of particular interest as it suggests that we never really 
come into contact with anything but representations. Depending on its position 
in the semiotic flow or web, a representation may act as a sign, an object, or an 
interpretant; but there is no way to confer the ontological status of object on 
certain things. In other words, the object would appear to be a purely relational 
– not to say relative – concept. If this is so, it is difficult to see how we could 
avoid the conclusion that the character of our objects is ultimately determined 
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by interpretation – whether the interpretation under consideration is actual or 
ideal.  
All this seems to go against Peirce’s later attempts to establish a realist 
framework for his semiotic philosophy. Of course, Peirce’s realism is qualified by 
his pragmatism, which means that it is primarily concerned with potential future  
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consequences rather than with the ontological standing of objects. Still, given 
that Peirce often characterises the object as something that logically precedes 
the sign and in some sense determines the direction of the semiotic process, one 
may feel quite uneasy about the conclusion that the being of objects is so 
intimately dependent on interpretation. To put it bluntly, Peirce’s semiotic 
position seems to imply that human beings have no concrete contact with the 
world “out there”; we are only acquainted with the objects of our 
interpretations.  
There are a several ways in which this picture should be modified; one of 
them will be considered in the next section, when we turn to Peirce’s account of 
collateral experience. Before that, however, we need to establish that Peirce did 
not simply abandon the semiotic stance in his later texts, as some of his positive 
remarks about realism might suggest. In an example reminiscent of later 
philosophical debates, Peirce discusses the cognitive being of a chair (MS 1334: 
44 [1905]). Obviously, the word ‘chair’ is a sign, and so is the idea or Vorstellung 
of a chair according to him. Attempts to break down the sign into elementary 
impressions will fail, because when we get down to the very impressions of 
sense, we will not find any chair. The reason, in Peirce’s words, is that “the life 
we lead is a life of signs. Sign under sign endlessly”. Peirce’s metaphorical 
conclusion sums up this point of view nicely: “To try to strip off the signs and get 
down to the very meaning itself is like trying to peel an onion and get down to 
the very onion itself” (ibid.). By the time we reach the core of the onion, we have 
very little in our hands; the bare object, freed from the layers of interpretations, 
would be of little or no use for us – if such a thing is even conceivable.  
 
Objects of Acquaintance  
So far, our discussion has shown that at least as far as human cognition is 
concerned, interpretation is an irreducible factor in Peirce’s account of semiotic 
relations. In a sense, this is already expressed by the fact that his view of the sign 
is triadic, i.e., that a sign relation is not merely constituted by a representational 
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relation between sign and object, but always also includes a third factor, 
theoretically articulated as the interpretant. However, this outlook, combined 
with Peirce’s anti-foundationalist theory of cognition and emphasis on the 
process of semiosis, seems to leave human agents afloat in an autonomous 
semiotic sphere. The position is in danger of sinking into an uncomfortable 
semiotic hermeticism (cf. Short 1994).  
Already in the first phase of semeiotic, one can detect a certain ambiguity 
with regard to questions pertaining to the status of signs and objects. As Peirce’s 
philosophy develops, a number of problems begin to crop up. In particular, he 
has difficulties to account for reference; the solution suggested by the early 
approach is to explain reference in terms of relations between thought-signs (cf. 
Hookway 2000, p. 117). This entails that the identification of individual objects 
must be performed by thought-signs, through descriptions. Yet, at the same time 
Peirce recognises that certain signs have a ‘pure demonstrative application’; that 
is, that their semiotic power is based on a real existential relation between sign 
and object, as in the case of a weathercock that serves as a sign of the wind. Such 
signs would appear to bring us into contact with an extra-semiotic reality – the 
actual wind, in this case. However, this conclusion does not fit into the 
framework of Peirce’s early semeiotic; and on closer inspection we will find that 
the demonstrative function does not really cause a breach in the semiotic 
stronghold. As Christopher Hookway (2000, p. 130) notes, Peirce’s demonstrative 
application of a thought-sign is always to another thought-sign of the same 
object; the existential relations utilised in cognition are in fact relations between 
judgments.  
All this changes dramatically in the mid-1880s, when Peirce returns to 
semiotic issues after a longish break. It is not perfectly clear what causes the 
alteration in Peirce’s outlook, but it seems reasonably clear that the move is 
connected to his work on logical quantifiers, and his view of their crucial 
indexical function. The change of mind is also linked to Peirce’s rejection of 
absolute idealism, as it is presented by Josiah Royce in his The Religious Aspect of 
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In the same context, Peirce criticises Hegel (and Hegelian 
philosophers) for ignoring the ‘outward clash’, which is a “direct consciousness of 
hitting and getting hit” that “enters into all cognition and serves to make it mean 
something real” (EP 1:233 [1885]). This indicates a realisation on Peirce’s part: a 
philosophical theory cannot leave brute fact out of account; it is how we come to 
be aware of the other – an undeniable force. Peirce gives an example of a man 
walking down Wall Street pursuing an internal dialogue on the existence of the 
external world (CP 1.431 [c. 1896]). If the man, lost in his world of thought-signs, 
bumps into another man who knocks him down, little real doubt about the 
existence of something beyond signs will be left in the his mind. Peirce’s firmer 
acknowledgement of the ‘brute’ aspect of reality, which is affiliated with the 
category of Secondness,
9 
has discernible consequences for his semeiotic. It is 
marked by the fact that Peirce pays more attention to the semiotic role on the 
object, and simultaneously re-considers the semiotic status of the demonstrative 
application – now named index.  
Comparing the status of the object in early and late semeiotic, one may 
discern a clear (although not perfectly consistent) pattern; the object is given a 
more central and even somewhat autonomous status in the mature semeiotic. 
This is not to say that Peirce would now consider the sign relation to consist of 
three perfectly sovereign components; nothing functions as a sign, object, or 
interpretant except within such a relation. In other words, an object is not an 
object in the proper sense apart from the sign. However, Peirce now emphasises 
that the object determines the sign, while remaining unaffected by the sign.  
At first blush, Peirce’s new standpoint may seem to amount to a rather 
naïve kind of realism, or else to re-introduce the banished thing-in-itself into the 
theory. Not surprisingly, the picture is much more complex than that. Namely, it 
is important to note that Peirce makes a distinction between two aspects of the 
object, usually called the immediate and dynamical (or real) object. The 
immediate object is the object as it is represented in the sign; it is, in a sense, the 
meaningful referential content of the sign, and as such partakes of the nature of 
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a sign. In a sign that would have the current president of the United States as its 
object, the immediate object would be the impression or conception of George 
Bush held by the interpreter, previous to the interpretation. The immediate 
object might not correspond to the real George Bush, who in this case would 
serve as the dynamical object of the relation. Yet, it would be a mistake to simply 
identify the dynamical object with a reality in a strict sense. The dynamical object 
may in fact be completely fictive. It is, however, characterised by three traits that 
distinguish it from the immediate object: (1) it is determinative, (2) it is 
unexpressed in the sign itself, and (3) it must be known by so-called collateral 
experience (also called ‘collateral observation’ or ‘extraneous experience’
10
).  
We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, - i.e. the Object as 
represented in the sign, - and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is 
altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather the 
Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, 
which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by collateral 
experience. For instance, I point my finger to what I mean, but I can’t make my 
companion know what I mean, if he can't see it, or if seeing it, it does not, to his 
mind, separate itself from the surrounding objects in the field of vision. It is 
useless to attempt to discuss the genuineness and possession of a personality 
beneath the histrionic presentation of Theodore Roosevelt with a person who 
recently has come from Mars and never heard of Theodore before. (CP 8.314 
[1909].)  
Before taking a closer look at collateral experience, it is necessary to say a 
few preliminary words about semiotic determination. This should not be 
confused with straightforward efficient causation; the determination in question 
is best grasped as a delimitation of the field of signification or semiosis, 
something which constrains the semiotic process (Joswick 1996, p. 98; Liszka 
1996, p. 23). Put differently, the dynamical object does not determine the sign 
absolutely, so as to always produce a given interpretant or set of interpretants. 
However, the determination of the sign by the dynamical object does place 
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limitations on how the sign can be grasped. I, for example, have an idea of 
George Bush which constitutes my immediate object of the president. It is a kind 
of composite picture, formed by numerous news broadcasts, articles, 
discussions, etc. It is obviously full of interpretative elements, my attempts to 
form as coherent picture of the man in question as possible. It is bound to be at 
least partly erroneous. I have never met George Bush, nor seen him in real life. 
Yet, there is a sense in which my sign ‘George Bush’ is determined by the real 
man. It is indicated by the fact that I am not able to interpret the sign in any way 
I like. I cannot, for example, genuinely take ‘George Bush’ to stand for ‘person 
who recently has come from Mars’, although it might prove to be an entertaining 
thought experiment. I will also modify my view of the president, if experience so 
dictates.  
Peirce claims that the basis of the objects dynamical, determinative power 
lies in the fact that the interpreter must have had his or her mind determined by 
collateral experience of the object, apart from his or her encounter with signs 
that represent, or claim to represent, the object in question. This is a strong 
claim, which seems to indicate a major change of mind in Peirce’s semiotic 
philosophy. It would appear that the earlier primacy of the semiotic sphere has 
been replaced by a more basic layer of raw experience. This impression is 
strengthened by the fact that Peirce emphasises that collateral experience does 
not mean knowledge of signs.  
 
I do not mean by “collateral observation” acquaintance with the system of 
signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the 
prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the sign. But by collateral 
observation, I mean previous acquaintance with what the sign denotes. 
Thus if the Sign be the sentence “Hamlet was mad,” to understand what 
this means one must know that men are sometimes in that strange state; 
one must have seen madmen or read about them; and it will be all the 
better if one specifically knows (and need not be driven to presume) what 
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Shakespeare’s notion of insanity was. All that is collateral observation and 
is no part of the Interpretant. (CP 8.179; cf. CP 8.181.)  
 
Consequently, there seems to be two distinct preconditions for interpretation. 
One must be acquainted with the system of signs in question (for instance know 
the language used) and have some collateral experience of the objects involved. 
The first condition is probably relatively uncontroversial. The second, on the 
contrary, calls for explication.  
It is perhaps easier to get to grips with the question of collateral experience 
if we turn to the kind of setting in which Peirce typically discusses the matter: a 
simple communicational situation, in which two people discuss some subject, or 
an utterer tries to convey some information to an interpreter.  
One of the arguments on which Peirce bases his requirement for collateral 
experience is that no description in itself suffices to indicate the object of a 
communicational exchange. If person A says “George Bush is an idiot” to person 
B, the sentence will be close to senseless unless B has some previous experience 
of the objects involved. That is, if B does not know who George Bush is, or has 
never met an idiot, the objects of the sentence will not be sufficiently fixed to 
function determinatively in the semiotic process. If B asks “Who?”, A can try to 
specify the reference by offering a description along the lines of “The acting 
president of the United States”; but then again, the understanding of that phrase 
depends on experience of such objects as presidents and the United States. The 
descriptions can be made more and more elaborate, but unless A somehow 
manages to refer to an object of B’s experience, no communication can take 
place. According to Peirce, such a reference cannot be achieved with pure 
descriptions, but requires indices, signs which in some sense indicate or call the 
attention to their objects, without thereby giving any substantial information 
about them.  
A couple of things need to be pointed out here. First of all, it is important 
to see that the experience in question need not be directly of the object in 
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question; it is sufficient that the interpreter can make a connection between the 
object referred to and his or her collateral experience. If B is familiar with the 
president of Finland, then his or her acquaintance with presidents can probably 
serve as a good starting-point for the identification of the sign ‘George Bush’. The 
claim, thus, is merely that some experiential background is needed – it may be 
quite insignificant in itself, but it must be able to serve as a starting-point for the 
specification of the object.  
Another thing that should be noted is that in communication the object 
need not be wholly determinate. Peirce gives several examples of this, such as 
two Englishmen who meet on the train and begin to discuss Charles the Second 
(CP 5.448 n. 1 [1906]). The shared collateral experience of the travellers – the 
fact that they are English, for example – ensures that they are talking about the 
same object, although they may have quite different images of the king in their 
mind (their immediate objects). It is not necessary that the objects should be 
identical in every sense; the common reference is actually ensured by the fact 
that much is left vague (cf. EP 2:409 [1907]). Too much specification might lead 
to communicational failure; if, for instance, one of the men would point out that 
Charles the Second was a different man on different days, and demanded that 
the other say precisely what Charles he meant, the process might come to a 
grinding halt. Similarly, I suppose that when I write ‘George Bush’ at this moment 
in history, my readers will have the required collateral experience to begin to 
understand what I am trying to say. We need not agree about the character of 
the man; that can be left unstated. All that is required is some notion of who 
George Bush is, based on some relevant experience. Strictly speaking, the subject 
employed in communications about George Bush is an immediate object; but its 
semiotic power is based on the communicants understanding that such an object 
approaches, however distantly, the dynamical object.  
Now, as noted, Peirce emphasises the role of indices in situations where 
the reference of communication (i.e., the identity of the object) needs to be 
established. What, then, are these indices? They are basically of two kinds: 
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words, which have been given an indexical function, and contextual
11 
factors. The 
first group includes words such as ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘I’, as well as quantifiers. They do 
not, by themselves, pinpoint the object, but they give indications or hints of how 
the relevant experience of the object can be obtained. The second kind of indices 
is indices proper, which involves almost no symbolic elements.
12 
The indices of 
this type are intimately connected to the situation and context of occurrence, 
and cannot be properly expressed by words. They are whatever in the 
circumstances of the communication, apart from the explicit verbal utterance 
itself, make the identification of the object possible. An example adopted from 
Peirce (cf. CP 2.357 [1902]) may help to clarify the point. Suppose, for instance, 
that someone comes into the room and shouts “Fire!” In itself, the word in 
question is hardly informative. If that was all we had to go on, we would 
probably calmly ask for more specific information. However, if we note that the 
utterer’s tone is panicky, and that his or her expression is worried, we will 
probably start to look for a way out. Add a smell of smoke to the setting, and 
there should be no doubt about the object of the sign – although we actually 
know very little about the object, and the whole thing might be a rather boorish 
prank. There are many indices at play in such a situation: the tone and the 
expression, for instance, but also less obvious contextual elements such as the 
room we are located in. Furthermore, some wild interpretations, which the signs 
alone would render possible, are excluded by common sense. Much is based on 
an unspecified understanding of things shared by the communicants.  
 
[I]f the utterer says “Fine day!” he does not dream of any possibility of the 
interpreter’s thinking of any mere desire for a fine day that a Finn of the 
North Cape might have entertained on April 19, 1776. He means, of course, 
to refer to the actual weather, then and there, where he and the 
interpreter are alike influenced by the fine weather, and have it near the 
surface of their common consciousness. (EP 2:407 [1907].)  
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Thus, indices need not be verbal or ostentatious, but can operate almost invisibly 
within a context of habits. On a broader scale, such signs help to specify in what 
universe of discourse communication takes place. That is, they indicate in what 
domain the objects referred to are to be found; or, to express the point 
differently, what kind of experience is required for the proper grasping of the 
objects. In an entry in The Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology Peirce and his 
student Christine Ladd-Franklin state the matter as follows:  
 
In every proposition the circumstances of its enunciation show that it 
refers to some collection of individuals or of possibilities, which cannot be 
adequately described, but can only be indicated as something familiar to 
both speaker and auditor. At one time it may be the physical universe, at 
another it may be the imaginary ‘world’ of some play or novel, at another a 
range of possibilities. (CP 2.536 [1901].)  
 
Enough has now been said to establish the relevance of the notion of collateral 
experience in Peirce’s mature theory of signs. It serves a kind of double function, 
on the one hand showing us some limits of the semiotic domain, while on the 
other reminding us of the relevance of situational and contextual factors. In fact, 
the crucial recognition of reality is achieved through indexical and experiential 
means. According to Peirce, we cannot distinguish fact from fiction by any 
description (CP 2.337 [c. 1895]).  
But how does this account fit in with Peirce’s view of the ubiquity of 
interpretation? Does collateral experience constitute a sphere untouched by 
interpretative elements? In a certain sense it does; it is something that is outside 
of the flow of thought-signs – a possible irritant, but also something that gives 
direction to interpretation. On the other hand, collateral experience is not 
absolutely beyond the reach of signs, although a special kind of signs, indices, are 
required to establish the contact. Words alone will not do.  
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Concluding Remarks: The Common Grounds of Experience  
The purpose of this paper was to show what role collateral experience plays in 
Peirce’s later semeiotic, and how it acts as a kind of antidote to his most radical 
semiotic claims. In doing so, I have certainly simplified matters, and ignored 
many twists and turns in the story. Little has been said, for instance, about 
Peirce’s understanding of triadic relations and his theory of categories, or the 
position of indices in his larger scheme of signs. I will not go further into these 
matters here, but will instead conclude with a couple of general observations on 
Peirce’s understanding of the relation between interpretation and experience.  
Given that Peirce emphasises the role of collateral experience in his later 
philosophy, one might surmise that he discards his earlier view of the 
omnipresence of interpretation. Through his distinction between the immediate 
and the dynamical object, Peirce seems to signal that at least one aspect of the 
object is of a non-representational nature. However, this impression needs to be 
qualified. True, Peirce does make it clear that collateral experience is not of the 
character of a representation, but of another mode of being (Secondness). 
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind how threadbare this experience is as 
such. It is only when it is interpreted and brought within the domain of signs that 
it can play a truly meaningful role.  
Furthermore, it may be of interest to note that Peirce’s use of the concept 
of ‘experience’ is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, ‘experience’ is 
understood in the sense of collateral experience, as something closely connected 
to brute fact. On the other hand, Peirce also uses ‘experience’ to denote a more 
substantial cognitive content in the life of human beings.  
 
[E]xperience can only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes 
interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense. Even more 
truly, since this matter of sense is a hypothetical something which we 
never can seize as such, free from all interpretive working over. (CP 7.538; 
cf. CP 4.172 [1897].)  
Signs vol. 4: pp.134 -161, 2010 
ISSN: 1902-8822  157   
 
 
In addition, we may observe that certain cognitive products, such as 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, may function dynamically, once they have established 
themselves. Obviously, we may form our first acquaintance with this object 
through the mediation of signs – as we do when we read about real people in 
newspapers, for instance. What the signs must do, then, is relate the sign 
‘Hamlet’ to objects with which we are already familiar (kings, Denmark, the 
universe of drama…). After a while, ‘Hamlet’ takes on a reality of its own, and 
therefore acts as an object that can delimit interpretation. The reins may be 
looser than in the case of existent objects; but as an object ‘Hamlet’ prescribes a 
certain domain of possible interpretations. It acts as a dynamical object; but its 
content-bearing being is nonetheless interpretational. Socially established signs 
may create objects with real dynamical power. Although “no phoenix really 
exists, real descriptions of the phoenix are well known to the speaker and his 
auditor; and thus the word is really affected by the Object denoted” (CP 2.261 [c. 
1903]).  
What these examples show, then, is that the dynamical aspect of objects is 
primarily associated with the influence or action of objects on signs. The 
recognition of the dynamical force of certain objects does not mean that the 
experiential object could not, upon analysis, be found to carry representational 
content. Therefore, it would appear at least feasible to assume that Peirce’s 
emphasis on the ubiquity of interpretation and his account of the role of 
collateral experience can be reconciled. After all, the recognition of something as 
real in a meaningful sense can only be achieved within a developed system – or 




Bergman, M. (forthcoming). Peirce’s Derivations of the Interpretant. Semiotica.  
Signs vol. 4: pp.134 -161, 2010 
ISSN: 1902-8822  158   
 
Buchler, J. 1940. The Accidents of Peirce’s System. The Journal of Philosophy, 37 
(10), 264-269.  
Deely, J. 1986. The Coalescence of Semiotic Consciousness. In Deely, J., Williams, 
B., & Kruse, F. (Eds.). Frontiers in Semiotics (pp. 5-34). Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.  
Eco, U. 1977. A Theory of Semiotics. London & Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press.  
Feibleman, J. 1946. An Introduction to Peirce’s Philosophy, Interpreted as a 
System. New York & London: Harper & Brothers Publishers.  
Gentry, G. 1952. Habit and the Logical Interpretant. In Wiener & Young (Eds.). 
Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press.  
Hausman, C. 1993. Charles S. Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Hookway, C. 2000. Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Joswick, H. 1996. The Object of Semeiotic. In Colapietro, V. M. & Olshewsky, T. 
M. (Eds.). Peirce’s Doctrine of Signs: Theory, Applications, and Connections 
(pp. 93-102). Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter.  
Liszka, J. J. 1996. A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles Sanders 
Peirce. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.  
Murphey, M. G. 1961. The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy. Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press.  
Pape, H. 1999. Why We Mean (always) More and (sometimes) Less than We Say: 
Context-Dependence and Vagueness in Peirce’s Semiotics. In Shapiro, M. 
(Ed.). The Peirce Seminar Papers: An Annual of Semiotic Analysis, Volume 
Four (pp. 589-621). New York: Berghahn Books.  
Parker, K. A. 1998. The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought. Nashville & London: 
Vanderbilt University Press.  
Signs vol. 4: pp.134 -161, 2010 
ISSN: 1902-8822  159   
 
Peirce, C. S. 1931-58. Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce. 8 vols. Ed. by 
Hartshorne, C. & Weiss, P. (vols. 1-6), & Burks, A. (vols. 7-8). Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.  
Peirce, C. S. 1977. Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles 
S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby. Ed. by Hardwick, C. S. Bloomington & 
London: Indiana University Press.  
Peirce, C. S 1982-. Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition. 6 vols. to 
date. Ed. by The Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press.  
Peirce, C. S. 1992-8. The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, 2 vols. 
Ed. by The Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press.  
Ransdell, J. 1977. Some Leading Ideas of Peirce’s Semiotic. Semiotica, 19 (3/4), 
157-178.  
Savan, D. 1981. The Unity of Peirce’s Thought. In Slater, J. G., Sumner, L. W., & 
Wilson, F. (Eds.). Pragmatism and Purpose: Essays Presented to Thomas A. 
Goudge (pp. 3-14). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.  
Short, T. L. 1994. On Hermeticism in Semiotics. In Shapiro, M. (Ed.). The Peirce 
Seminar Papers: An Annual of Semiotic Analysis, Volume Two (pp.231-259). 
Providence & Oxford: Berghahn Books.  
Short, T. L. 1996. Interpreting Peirce’s Interpretant: A Response to Lalor, Liszka, 
and Meyers. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, XXXII (4), 489-
541.  
Weiss, P. 1940. The Essence of Peirce’s System. The Journal of Philosophy, 37 




The serious re-evaluation of Peirce’s thought began with the publication of the first volume of 
the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce in 1931. In the debates that followed, scholars 
such as Paul Weiss (1940) and James Feibleman (1946) interpreted Peirce’s philosophy as a unity, 
while Justus Buchler (1940), Thomas Goudge (1953), and Murray Murphey (1961) judged, on 
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varying grounds, that it was either inconsistent or at least consisted of partly incompatible 
phases.  
2 
‘Semeiotic’ is one of Peirce’s names for his theory of signs. I will use it occasionally to mark that I 
am talking about Peirce’s position, not about semiotics in general. I use the adjective ‘semiotic’ 
when referring to the subject-matters of such theories.  
3 
In one of his critical remarks on Peirce’s relevance, Richard Rorty claims that one reason for the 
“undeserved apotheosis” of Peirce has been that his theory of signs has been wrongly judged to 
be an important precursor of the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy. Rorty is correct in 
emphasising the difference between Peirce’s perspective and later linguistic approaches; the 
interesting question, of course, is whether this renders Peirce’s philosophical outlook simply 
indefensible. This question lies beyond the scope of this article; but it should perhaps be pointed 
out that the paper has been written in the belief that there is something valuable in the Peircean 
point of view, in spite of its alleged shortcomings.  
4 
In accordance with the customs of Peirce scholarship, I will refer to Peirce’s texts using 
abbreviations. CP x.y refers to The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce; v indicates volume 
number, p paragraph number. EP v:p refers to The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical 
Writings; v indicates volume number, p page number. MS m refers to an original manuscript; m 
indicates manuscript number according to Robin’s catalogue. SS p refers to Semiotics and 
Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby; p indicates 
page number. W v:p refers to Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition; v indicates 
volume number, p page number. Where known, the year of writing or publication will be given.  
5 
The reference to ‘external facts’ in the first denial may seem to contradict this conclusion. 
However, it is possible to interpret this externality as the claim that signs must be public, and that 
there are, in fact, no such things as private signs, which would belong exclusively to the 
individual. Peirce expresses this somewhat cryptically by stating that it is as plausible to say that 
we are products of signs, as it is to say that human beings are the makers of signs.  
6 
‘Semiosis’ is Peirce’s term – culled from the old Greek – for the action of signs. It is contrasted to 
dyadic or dynamical action, such as the mechanical action between physical bodies (see EP 2:411 
[1907]).  
7 
On the other hand, Peirce abandons the distinction between sign and representamen some 
years later, stating that the ordinary word sign will do well, as long as it is understood that the 
cognitive or mind-like character of semiotic relations is not necessarily due to the conscious 
activity of a human mind (see SS 193 [1905]; SS 81[1908]).  
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8 
For an illuminating account of the relevance of Royce’s idealism on the evolution of Peirce’s 
philosophy, see Hookway 2000, p. 108 ff. Peirce begins to develop the new semiotic position in 
an unpublished critical review, titled “An American Plato”, of the aforementioned book.  
9 
Peirce’s categories are not discussed in this paper, although they are rarely absent from his 
philosophy. Suffice it to say here that Firstness is the category of quality and immediacy, 
Secondness the category of fact and reaction, and Thirdness the category of thought and signs. 
Peirce recognises the reality of Thirdness in his early philosophy, but later affirms realism with 
regard to Secondness, and eventually to Firstness as well.  
10 
There may be differences in Peirce’s usage of these terms; but as it seems to be at most a 
question of rather fine nuances, I will not discuss the matter here. I will just note that Helmut 
Pape (1999, p. 609) has criticised Peirce’s use of the term ‘collateral observation’ as misleading, 
claiming that it suggests that all experiential observation takes place in the same situation of 
utterance. I think that the concept of ‘collateral experience’ is not touched by this judgment.  
11 
Peirce appears to use the word ‘context’ in a different sense than the one employed here. For 
Peirce, the semiotic context seems to be provided by a system of signs, not by the broader 
situation (see EP 2:407 [1907]).  
12 
Indices and symbols are two important classes of sign identified by Peirce; the latter group 
consists of conventional signs, or signs based on habit.  
 
